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Workers' Compensation
by H. Michael Bagley*
Daniel C. Kniffen"
John G. Blackmon, Jr."
and
Katherine D. Dixon**
The 1996-1997 survey period was an active one in the field of workers'
compensation. Significant decisions were handed down in a number of
areas that will significantly impact important parts of the workers'
compensation system.
The first section of this Article reviews what, by comparison to
previous years, was a relatively mild legislative session with regard to
workers' compensation. The next two sections address important cases
that affect the Drug-Free Workplace Act' and the defense of cases
involving intoxication as well as important cases involving a claimant's
burden of proof to show a change in condition. The remainder of the
Article summarizes other important decisions by subject area.
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I. WORKERS' COMPENSATION LEGISLATION 1997
As compared with other legislative sessions during this decade, the
1997 Session of the Georgia General Assembly did not generate
significant changes in the Workers' Compensation Act.' Most changes
would be labeled "house-keeping" changes, which do not significantly
impact substantive rights or procedures.
A

Civil Penaltiesand the Costs of Collection

The Workers' Compensation Act was refined to specifically include
attorney fees in the recoverable collection costs of civil penalties
resulting from a failure to follow any order or directive issued by the
State Board of Workers' Compensation ("the Board").'
B. FraudInvestigation
The Board is staffed with fraud investigators empowered with the
authority
to execute search warrants, make arrests, and issue subpoe4
nas.
C.

Regulation of Third-PartyAdministrators
The Board is empowered to promulgate rules and regulations to set
forth requirements for third-party administrators and servicing agents,
including insurers acting as third-party administrators or servicing
agents, regarding their management or administration of workers'
compensation claims.' For example, this provision gives the Board the
authority to directly fine third-party administrators and servicing agents
when they fail to follow provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act or
Board rules.6 Additionally, the third-party administrators and servicing
agents must demonstrate to the Board's satisfaction that they are duly
licensed and in full compliance with all applicable requirements of Title
33, the Georgia Insurance Code.7
D.

CatastrophicInjury Defined
The definition of catastrophic injury was amended to require that a
claimant show both the inability to do the job performed prior to the

2. 1997 Ga. Laws 1367-75.
3. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-18(e) (Supp. 1997).
4.

Id. § 34-9-24(c).

5. Id. § 34-9-121(b) (1992 & Supp. 1997).
6. Id.
7. Id. § 34-9-121(a).
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injury and the inability to perform other work in the national economy,
not just either one of those criteria.'
E.

Indemnity Benefits

The maximum temporary total disability benefits were increased from
$300 per week to $325 per week.9 Maximum temporary partial
disability benefits were increased from $192.50 to $216.67 per week.10
II. EMPLOYEE REFUSAL OF DRUG TESTING AFTER INJURY
Undeniably, drug and alcohol use increases the rate and severity of
workplace accidents." Drug testing programs have become prevalent
since President Ronald Reagan issued an executive order creating a
mandatory urine testing program for 12
federal workers and set the trend
for drug testing by private employers.
In 1993 the Georgia General Assembly enacted the Drug-Free
Workplace Programs Act as an integral part of the Workers' Compensation Act. 3 In many respects this Act is similar to the Federal DrugFree Workplace Act.' 4 The Georgia General Assembly's stated intent

8. Id. § 34-9-200.1(gX6).
9. Id. § 34-9-261.
10. Id. § 34-9-262.
11. It is estimated that alcohol and illicit drugs account for more than $137 billion in
lost productivity. Alcohol abuse contributes to forty percent of industrial fatalities and
forty-seven percent of industrial injuries. KEVIN B. ZEESE, DRUG TESTING LEGAL MANUAL
§ 1.02 at 1-111, -114 (1993) (citing HENRICK HARWOOD, RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTrrUTE,
ECONOMIC COST To SOCIETy OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE AND ILLNESS (1980)).
12. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 730

(1988).
13. O.C.GA §§ 34-9-410 to -421.
14. 41 U.S.C. §§ 701-707. The Federal Drug-Free Workplace Act applies to all federal
contractors. The main thrust of the federal act is awareness and education rather than
actual testing. Most of the requirements of the federal act are encompassed in the state
act. In order to comply with the federal statute, the employer must do the following:
(A) [Publish] a statement notifying employees that the unlawful manufacture,
distribution, dispensation, possession, or use of a controlled substance is
prohibited in the person's workplace and [specify] the actions that will be taken
against employees for violations of such prohibition;
(B) [Establish] a drug-free awareness program to inform employees about(i) the dangers of drug abuse in the workplace;
(ii) the person's policy of maintaining a drug-free work place;
(iii) any available drug counseling, rehabilitation, and employee assistance
programs; and
(iv) the penalties that may be imposed upon employees for drug abuse
violations;
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was to promote drug-free workplaces to help employers maximize their
productivity levels, enhance their competitive positions in the marketplace, and reach their desired levels of success without experiencing the
costs, delays, and tragedies associated with work-related accidents
resulting from employees' substance abuse.1" The Act encourages
employers to implement a drug-free workplace program by rewarding
employers achieving certification as a Drug-Free Workplace with a
workers' compensation insurance premium discount."6 The statutory
conditions precedent to certification as a Drug-Free Workplace include
a written policy statement, testing procedures established in accordance
with statutory guidelines, an employee assistance program, an employee
education program, a supervisor training program, and confidentiality
standards. 7
Once certified, the threshold condition for implementation is notice.
Prior to testing, all employees and job applicants must be given notice
of the testing policy at least one time.' In addition, employees and job
applicants must be provided with a written policy statement containing,
among other things, "the actions the employer may take against an
employee or job applicant on the basis of a positive confirmed test
result" 9 and "the consequences of refusing to submit to a drug test."20
One consequence should be that either event may affect the employee's
right to workers' compensation benefits. The employer must post the
substance abuse testing policy on vacancy announcements in a conspicu-

(C) [Make] it a requirement that each employee to be engaged in the performance
of such contract be given a copy of the statement required by subparagraph (A);
(D) [Notify] the employee in the statement required by subparagraph (A), that as
a condition of employment on such contract, the employee will(i) abide by the terms of the statement; and
(ii) notify the employer of any criminal drug statute conviction for a violation
occurring in the workplace no later than 5 days after such conviction;
(E) [Notify] the contracting agency within 10 days after receiving notice under
subparagraph (DXii) from an employee or otherwise [receive] actual notice of such
conviction;
(F) [Impose] a sanction on, or [require] the satisfactory participation in a drug
abuse assistance or rehabilitation program by, any employee who is so convicted,
as required by section 703 of this title; and
(G) [Make] a good faith effort to continue to maintain a drug-free workplace
through implementation of subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), and (F).
41 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1994).
15. O.C.GA. § 34-9-410.
16. Id. § 34-9-412.
17. Id. § 34-9-413(aXl)-(5), (b).
18. Id. § 34-9-414(a).
19. Id. § 34-9-414(a)(1XB).
20. Id. § 34-9-414(aX4).
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ous location on the employer's premises, and copies of the policy must be
made available for inspection by employees or job applicants during
regular business hours in the employer's personnel office or another
suitable location.2
The Drug-Free Workplace Programs Act is not an isolated provision
of the Workers' Compensation Act. For example, the Drug-Free
Workplace Programs Act sets out specific guidelines regarding when
employees are subject to testing as well as proper methods of collection,
storage, and analysis of specimens.22 Recovery under the Workers'
Compensation Act is barred for any injury that is the proximate result
of intoxication by drugs or alcohol.2" Furthermore, Official Code of
Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 34-9-17(b)(3) creates a rebuttable
presumption against compensability of an on-the-job injury if the
employee makes an unjustified refusal to submit to a post-accident drug
test conducted in compliance with the Drug-Free Workplace Programs
Act.24
The applicability of the rebuttable presumption when there has not
been full compliance with the Drug-Free Workplace Programs Act was
the issue in Thomas v. Diamond Rug & Carpet Mills.2' The court of
appeals addressed whether an employee of a self-insured employer, who
had not established a drug-free workplace program, may be denied
workers' compensation benefits under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-17(b)(3)
based on the employee's refusal to submit to a drug test following an onthe-job injury if the employee had not received notice of the consequences of the refusal pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 34-9-414.26
The claimant in Thomas drove a forklift into a wall, causing injuries
to his left foot and ankle. Less than an hour before the accident, a
supervisory employee observed Thomas smoking what appeared to be a
marijuana pipe. A registered nurse at the hospital where treatment was
provided asked claimant to provide a urine specimen for the workers'

Id. § 34-9-414(c).
22. Id. § 34-9-415.

21.

23. Id. § 34-9-17(b).

24. The statute provides as follows:
If the employee unjustifiably refuses to submit to a reliable, scientific test to be
performed in the manner set forth in Code Section 34-9-415 to determine the
presence of alcohol, marijuana, or a controlled substance in the employee's blood,
urine, breath, or other bodily substance, then there shall be a rebuttable
presumption that the accident and injury or death were caused by the consumption of alcohol or the ingestion of marijuana or a controlled substance.
Id. § 34-9-17(b)(3).
25. 226 Ga. App. 403, 486 S.E.2d 664 (1997).
26. Id. at 403, 486 S.E.2d at 665-66.
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compensation drug screen test. Claimant refused this request and three
similar requests made during the week he was hospitalized, despite his
admission of his awareness that the employer required workers to
submit to drug testing after a work-related injury and that he could be
terminated for refusing. Thomas claimed, however, that he had not been
told his refusal could result in the denial of workers' compensation
benefits."
The Administrative Law Judge ("AIX) denied benefits. The appellate
division of the Board and the superior court affirmed." The court of
appeals reversed and remanded the denial of workers' compensation
benefits arising from claimant's refusal to take a drug test, holding that
the presumption in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-17(b)(3) is not applicable if the
employee was not notified that it would affect his right to obtain
benefits." The court reasoned that because the presumption provision
incorporates O.C.G.A. section 34-9-415 by reference, the entire DrugFree Workplace Programs Act should be incorporated because of a catchall provision in section 34-9-415(a), which provides that "all testing
conducted by an employer shall be in conformity with the standards and
procedures established in this Article and all applicable rules adopted by
the State Board of Workers' Compensation pursuant to this Article.' °
The court's reasoning renders meaningless the language in O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-17(b)(3) that incorporates 'only the portion of the Drug-Free
Workplace Programs Act defining the type of "reliable, scientific test"
that must be offered and rejected in order to trigger the rebuttable
presumption. This reasoning arguably distorts the meaning of the
statute, thereby violating the rule of construction requiring that a
statute be interpreted to give meaning to all of its parts.3 1
Although this comment apparently did not form the basis for the
holding, the court also noted that "fundamental standards of due process
require that the employee be given notice" that the refusal to submit to
the drug test may bar recovery of workers' compensation benefits.3 2
The court also made reference without explanation to "the equal
protection of laws."'
Because no government or state action was
involved, but only the rights of an employee against a private employer,
the application of these constitutional principles would have been novel

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 404, 486 S.E.2d at 665-66.
Id. at 405, 486 S.E.2d at 666.
Id at 405-06, 486 S.E.2d at 667.
Id. at 404-05, 486 S.E.2d at 666.
Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 747-48, 452 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1994).
Thomas, 226 Ga. App. at 405, 486 S.E.2d at 667.

I&
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and unique.' Even if the drug test had been requested within the
framework of the Drug-Free Workplace Programs Act in addition to the
Workers' Compensation Act, extensive government regulation alone does
not convert actions of a private business into state action for purposes
of a constitutional analysis.3 5
While the holding in Thomas is difficult to reconcile with the plain
statutory language, 6 all employers in Georgia, whether participants,
non-participants, or exempt from the Drug-Free Workplace Programs
Act, must fully comply to invoke the rebuttable presumption for the
unjustified refusal to submit to a post-accident drug test.
III. CHANGE IN CONDITION: REVISED BURDENS OF PROOF
No fewer than ten cases during the survey period dealt with some
aspect of the Georgia Supreme Court landmark decision in Maloney v.
7 which established that a claimant seeking to
Gordon County Farms,"
recover additional disability benefits based upon a "change in condition' S must show (1) a loss of earning power as a result of a compensable work-related injury, (2) physical limitations attributable to that
injury, and (3) a diligent but unsuccessful effort to secure suitable
employment.," Although the decision in Maloney predictably sparked
cases attempting to delineate what constitutes a "diligent"job search, it
also produced a number of other decisions that both extend the Maloney
rationale and perhaps create some unnecessary confusion.
Because Maloney partially reversed Aden's Minit Market v. Landon,'
not surprisingly, the first few court of appeals decisions following
Maloney dealt with whether cases decided under the holding in Aden's
must be reversed or remanded. The court's answer to this question is
no. In Lukowski v. Capitoline Products, Inc.,"' claimant suffered a
severe injury to his left hand and received workers' compensation

34. Ritchie v. Walker Mfg. Co., 963 F.2d 1119, 1122 (8th Cir. 1992) (employee's claim
that termination for failing drug test violated state and federal constitution was without
merit because there was no state or government action); Greco v. Halliburton Co., 674 F.
Supp. 1447, 1451 (D. Wyo. 1987) (constitutional proscriptions against invasions of privacy,
taking of property without due process, and unauthorized searches or seizures were not
applicable to discharge by private employer).
35. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974).

36. Application for certiorari to the Georgia Supreme Court was pending at the time
that this Article went to press.
37. 265 Ga. 825, 462 S.E.2d 606 (1995).
38. O.C.G.A § 34-9-104(a) (1992).
39. 265 Ga. at 828, 462 S.E.2d at 608-09.
40. 202 Ga. App. 219, 413 S.E.2d 738 (1991).
41. 222 Ga. App. 140, 473 S.E.2d 236 (1996).
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benefits for the amputation of one finger and related surgeries.
Claimant returned to work at a job modified to accommodate his injuries
but was subsequently fired because, believing he would fail, he refused
to take a company-sponsored drug test.42 The ALJ applied the Aden's
burden of proof, which required claimant not only to show an inability
to obtain suitable employment but also the reason the employment was
refused.' The AU concluded that claimant demonstrated a sincere
search for suitable alternative employment." The appellate division of
the Board disagreed, however, and concluded that while Lukowski had
some impairment in his left hand, he failed to demonstrate that this
impairment hindered him from finding employment.4 The appellate
division was impressed with evidence that claimant's injuries did not
prevent him from performing the manipulation of small objects and that
following his return to work, he was able to perform his regular job
(which included building pallets with the use of saws and. a nail gun
without assistance). The evidence further indicated that although
Lukowski had applied for other work, he had done so during the holiday
season when there were not many job openings and had also identified
physical limitations unrelated to his compensable hand injury."
Before the court of appeals, Lukowski claimed that the superior court
erred in affirming the appellate division of the Board by applying the
Aden's burden of proof.47 The court of appeals rejected this argument,
noting that although Maloney overruled Aden's to the extent that it
imposed an additional burden to prove the reasons why a claimant was
not hired by a prospective employer, Maloney still requires a claimant
to prove a diligent but unsuccessful effort to secure suitable employment.' The court found that, notwithstanding references to Aden's, the
proper Maloney burden of proof was applied and that sufficient evidence
was present within the record for the Board to conclude that Lukowski
had not demonstrated that his job-related impairment precluded him
from finding employment.4"
A similar result was reached in Textile Coating,Ltd. v. Ramirez,5' in
which the Board denied claimant's request for additional disability
benefits based upon a change in condition, but the superior court

42.

Id. at 140, 473 S.E.2d at 236-37.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Aden's, 202 Ga. App. at 220, 413 S.E.2d at 739-40.
Lukowski, 222 Ga. App. at 140-41, 473 S.E.2d at 237.
Id. at 141, 473 S.E.2d at 237.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 141-42, 473 S.E.2d at 237.
Id. at 142, 473 S.E.2d at 238.
223 Ga. App. 236, 477 S.E.2d 388 (1996).
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reversed, holding that because the Board relied upon Aden's, the case
should be remanded for a new evidentiary hearing under the rule
announced in Maloney.5 1 On remand, the appellate division did not
hold a new evidentiary hearing but simply reviewed the record
established at the previous ALJ hearing. The appellate division agreed
with claimant that the prospective employers rejected him because of his
previous on-the-job injury"2 The court of appeals rejected the employer-insurer's argument that the appellate division was required to hold
a new evidentiary hearing to apply the Maloney burden of proof."3 The
court first noted that in Maloney "the Supreme Court gave the Board the
power to infer from the employee's lack of success that employers refused
to hire him because of an injury."" The court also noted that a new
evidentiary hearing was not necessary "[blecause the only question
presented was one of applying known facts to a different legal standard."55 Although Maloney specifically overruled a portion of Aden's,
it does not necessarily follow that cases decided under the Aden's burden
of proof are subject to reversal.
The "inference" allowed by Maloney can cut both ways. In TV
Minority v. Chaffins," the A.J denied Chaffins' change in condition
claim even though the evidence demonstrated that Chaffins conducted
a sincere search to obtain suitable employment. The AUJ concluded that
claimant's "economic condition is caused by his own self-imposed wage
requirements and is unrelated to his physical condition." 7 The ALJ
found that although Chaffins presented evidence that he was restricted
from driving, working in high places, and working around heavy
machinery, the evidence also demonstrated that Chaffins continued to
drive four-wheel vehicles and that he built as many as sixty "expert
level" model cars in 1994." The court of appeals reversed the superior
court's reversal of the denial of benefits, finding that the evidence was
sufficient for the Board to conclude that Chaffins' economic condition
was not related to his physical condition.59
Two cases during the survey period dealt with the use of vocational
rehabilitation experts to meet the Maloney burden of proof. In McEver

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 236, 477 S.E.2d at 388.
Id. at 237, 477 S.E.2d at 389.
1&
Id. (citing Maloney, 265 Ga. at 828, 462 S.E.2d at 609).
Id.
223 Ga. App. 495, 479 S.E.2d 373 (1996).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id
Id. at 496, 479 S.E.2d at 374.
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v. Worrell Enterprises,' claimant sought additional workers' compensation disability benefits following her termination from Worrell Enterprises on August 12, 1993. In support of her claim that a prior compensable
injury with Worrell prevented her from working, McEver presented the
testimony of a vocational rehabilitation supplier, who opined, based on
telephone conversations with prospective employers, that McEver was
not hired because of her compensable injury."' The court of appeals
affirmed the Board's rejection of this testimony as based upon inadmissible hearsay.62 The court pointed out that in Maloney the supreme court
approved the court of appeals' rejection of a claimant's testimony
regarding why she was not hired by a potential employer as inadmissible
hearsay.63 The court went on to note that while an expert may
partially base his opinions on hearsay, an expert opinion rendered
exclusively upon hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the
recognized exceptions to the general rule." The court was impressed
with the fact that even if the rehabilitation supplier's opinion had been
admissible, it would have been insufficient to meet claimant's burden of
proof under Maloney." The court noted that the rehabilitation supplier
admitted that the two potential employers she actually talked to never
refused to hire claimant and, indeed, never actually told him that
claimant's injury would preclude her hiring.6
The court also rejected claimant's argument that Maloney eliminated
the proximate cause element from the claimant's burden of proof in a
change in condition case.67 To the contrary, the court found that
Maloney affirmatively provides the Board with the ability to infer from
evidence presented whether the proximate cause of claimant's unemployment is the compensable injury:
Once the claimant shows that she has made diligent but unsuccessful
efforts to obtain suitable employment, the fact finder may, in its
discretion, infer from the evidence that the claimant's disability is the
proximate cause of her unemployment. However, Maloney does not
require the fact finder to draw this inference, and it is not an abuse of

60. 223 Ga. App. 627, 478 S.E.2d 445 (1996).
61. Id. at 627-28, 478 S.E.2d at 446.
62. Id. at 628, 478 S.E.2d at 447.
63. Id. at 630,478 S.E.2d at 448 (citing Gordon County Farm v. Maloney, 214 Ga. App.
253, 255, 447 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1994), reu'd on othergrounds, 265 Ga. 825, 828, 462 S.E.2d
606, 609 (1995)).
64. Id. (citing Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Raybitz, 205 Ga. App. 174,421 S.E.2d 767 (1992);
Haynes v. Huff, 165 Ga. App. 192, 299 S.E.2d 902 (1983)).
65. Id.

66. Id.
67. Id. at 629, 478 S.E.2d at 447.
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discretion for it to make an alternative inference. That is, the fact
finder could properly infer that the claimant's continuing unemployment was due to a number of reasons other than her disability. Thus,
it is not necessarily sufficient for the claimant simply to show that she
has unsuccessfully sought employment.'
The court therefore affirmed the Board's inference from the evidence
that McEver's unemployment was not proximately caused by her original
compensable injury"
The court reached a similar result in Waffle House v. Padgett,7"
although it curiously raised a question in a footnote about the rejection
of expert testimony based upon hearsay."1 The decision in Padgett is
also significant for its holding on the relevance of an employee's
termination from employment in a subsequent change in condition claim.
Padgett suffered a work-related injury while working for Waffle House
in February 1993 and received disability benefits until she returned to
light-duty work for Waffle House in November 1993. After returning to
work, Padgett received temporary partial disability benefits pursuant to
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-262 because the wages from her light-duty job
were less than her pre-accident average weekly wage. Waffle House
terminated Padgett's employment in September 1994. At a subsequent
hearing in which Padgett sought additional disability benefits based
upon a change in condition, the ALJ determined that Padgett was
terminated as a result of her work-related disability and that this
obviated any determination of whether claimant made a diligent search
for suitable employment.72 Although awarding benefits to claimant
based on her termination, the AU further determined that claimant did
not otherwise meet her burden of proof to show an inability to find
employment as a result of her injury." The court of appeals reversed,
holding that the reasons behind claimant's termination by Waffle House
were not a proper inquiry at the change in condition hearing: "The
superior court correctly held that the cause of Padgett's termination is
not dispositive of her claim of change in condition .... [Tihe finder of
whether the claim is supported by a diligent effort to
fact must consider
74
find other work."

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id
Id., 478 S.E.2d at "7-48.
225 Ga. App. 144, 483 S.E.2d 131 (1997).
Id. at 147 n.1, 483 S.E.2d at 133 n.1.
Id.
Id
Id.
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The court of appeals specifically held, therefore, that the cause of a
claimant's termination does not provide any basis for the resumption of
disability benefits based upon a change in condition."5 Rather, the
claimant must present evidence, as required by Maloney, of a causal
relationship between her unemployment and the on-the-job injury,
including a diligent but unsuccessful effort to find suitable employment."6 Because the ALJ specifically found that Padgett did not
conduct a diligent job search, the award of benefits was reversed.
Although the superior court reversed the decision of the Board, finding
that Padgett had conducted a diligent job search, the court of appeals
reversed because there was sufficient evidence in the record to support
the Board's determination, including evidence that claimant submitted
altered employment applications to the court and told a prospective
employer that "she had a case against Waffle House and she wanted to
prove that she was unable to find a job."7'
The decision in Padgett contains an interesting footnote in which the
court, referring to the rejection of opinion testimony by a job specialist
as improperly based on hearsay, stated: "We question whether the
testimony of this witness, who qualified as an expert, was in fact
inadmissible.""9 The court then cited two cases, McEver and Orkin
Exterminating Co. v. McIntosh,' implying a conflict on this issue."'
The court in McIntosh noted in dicta that the fact an expert's opinion is
based on hearsay goes to the weight and credibility of the testimony, not
its admissibility 2 Although the three-judge panel that decided McEver
explicitly held that the testimony of a vocational rehabilitation expert is
inadmissible if based solely on hearsay," the panel deciding Padgett
may have felt differently although it specifically refused to reach this
issue.84
In Diamond Rug & Carpet Mills v. Moses,8 the court of appeals held
that the Maloney burden of proof applies to a claimant's initial burden
of proof to show disability from a job-related injury and not only in
75. Id.
76. Id. at 146, 483 S.E.2d at 132-33.
77. Id. at 147, 483 S.E.2d at 133.
78. Id. at 146, 483 S.E.2d at 133.
79. Id. at 147 n.1, 483 S.E.2d at 133 n.1.
80. 215 Ga. App. 587, 452 S.E.2d 159 (1994).
81. Padgett, 225 Ga. App. at 146, 483 S.E.2d at 133.
82. McIntosh, 215 Ga. App. at 592-93, 452 S.E.2d at 165 (citing King v. Browning, 246
Ga. 46, 268 S.E.2d 653 (1980); Jones v. Ray, 159 Ga. App. 734, 285 S.E.2d 42 (1981)).
83. McEver, 223 Ga. App. at 632, 478 S.E.2d at 449.
84. Padgett, 225 Ga. App. at 146, 483 S.E.2d at 133. At the time this Article went to
press, certiorari to the Georgia Supreme Court had been applied for.
85. 221 Ga. App. 807, 472 S.E.2d 565 (1996).
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change in condition cases." Although Moses sustained a work-related
injury while working for Diamond Mills in November 1992, he only
missed one full day of work as a result of this injury. Rather, Moses
continued working until terminated in November 1993 for causes
unrelated to his disability. 7 The court of appeals held that the burden
of proof required by Maloney in cases when a claimant has received
disability benefits and subsequently seeks additional benefits based upon
a change in condition is the same burden a claimant must show to prove
entitlement to disability benefits following the initial injury' "The
procedural posture of the two cases is irrelevant as they both address
the same dispositive question--'whether [the] employee sustained a loss
of earning capacity as a result of a compensable work-related injury.'"89
To show entitlement to disability benefits following a compensable
injury, therefore, the claimant will not only have to show an injury
arising out of and in the course of employment; he will also have to show
proof of disability that will include a diligent but unsuccessful job
search.
In United Family Life Insurance Co. v. Sasser,' the court of appeals
applied the Maloney burden of proof but did not focus on whether
claimant made a diligent but unsuccessful job search.9 ' Rather, the
issue in Sasser was whether claimant's original physical injury still
caused her to suffer physical limitations. While working as a regional
manager for United Family Life, Sasser was injured in a work-related
automobile accident in March 1991. She returned to work after six
weeks and continued working until the company eliminated her full time
position in June 1993. At her subsequent hearing for benefits based
upon a change in condition, Sasser contended that the 1991 accident
caused or exacerbated a condition known as "fibromyalgia," which in
turn prevented her from performing work at the level she did with
United Family Life.92 The court of appeals found that there was
sufficient evidence to support the Board's conclusion that claimant's
fibromyalgia was not related to the 1991 accident. '
Among other
things, the record contained evidence that a number of the symptoms
Sasser complained of did not appear until long after the accident. The

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

1d at 809, 472 S.E.2d at 567.
1& at 807, 472 S.E.2d at 566.
Id. at 809, 472 S.E.2d at 567.
Id. (quoting Maloney, 265 Ga. at 827, 462 S.E.2d at 608).
224 Ga. App. 871, 482 S.E.2d 491 (1997).
Id. at 871, 482 S.E.2d at 491.
I&, 482 S.E.2d at 492.
Id. at 872, 482 S.E.2d at 492.
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record also contained expert medical testimony that while fibromyalgia
can be exacerbated by trauma, its symptoms can worsen in the absence
of trauma, and there are no known causes for the disease." The AU
was, therefore, authorized to find that claimant's 1991 accident neither
caused nor exacerbated her underlying fibromyalgia; thus, the accident
was no longer responsible for any physical limitations she may have."
With this lack of evidence, claimant could not meet a requirement of
Maloney that she continue to suffer physical limitations from the jobrelated injury.9
The most troubling case issued during the survey period regarding
change in condition is Georgia Pacific Corp. v. Wilson," which will
confuse the applicability of Maloney when a claimant surreptitiously
returns to work while still drawing disability benefits. While drawing
disability benefits from a job-related injury occurring while he was
working with Georgia Pacific, Wilson became employed by Spartan, Inc.
to do light-duty work as a checker. This job lasted only two months, but
during that time, Wilson worked under his son's name and Social
Security number, apparently to hide his employment from Georgia
Pacific. Georgia Pacific subsequently suspended Wilson's disability
benefits when it learned of Wilson's return to work and requested a
hearing to adjudicate both the suspension of benefits and its right to
reimbursement from Wilson for overpayment of disability benefits.
Wilson neither testified nor appeared at the hearing. Georgia Pacific
argued that because the evidence demonstrated that Wilson returned to
work, Wilson bore the burden of proof under Maloney to demonstrate a
further entitlement to disability. benefits, reasoning that Wilson's
employment established a change in condition for the better.9" The
court of appeals disagreed, holding that because the employer requested
a hearing, it bore the burden of proof to show a change in condition."
Moreover, the court held that the burden of proof did not shift in the
same hearing from the employer to the claimant once the employer
The court went on
established that Wilson had returned to work.'
to state: "Unless and until the ALJ or the State Board makes a new

94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 872-73, 482 S.E.2d at 493.
Id. at 873, 482 S.E.2d at 493.
Id.
225 Ga. App. 663, 484 S.E.2d 699 (1997).

98. Id. at 663-64, 484 S.E.2d at 700-01.
99. Id. at 664, 484 S.E.2d at 700-01.
100. Id.
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award, the prior award continues as res judicata, and the movant
continues to have the burden of proof."1"'
The decision is flawed in several respects. The cases cited for the
proposition that an award of benefits "continues as res judicata" until
the Board makes a new award were all decided before 1978, the year the
workers' compensation system in Georgia changed from the so-called
"agreement" system to an automatic payment system that required the
commencement of benefits without an award and, similarly, the possible
suspension of benefits (in limited circumstances) without an award.'
Since the 1978 amendments, 3 the rule has been uniformly applied so
that the employer bears the burden of proof to show a change in
condition if benefits are unilaterally suspended without the claimant's
actual return to work; however, the claimant bears the burden of proof
if he actually returns to work and subsequently seeks additional
benefits. 1" The court of appeals thoroughly discussed and explicitly
approved this procedure in its 1983 decision in Cornell-Young v.
Minter."°5 Ironically, the court in Wilson cites Minter as authority for
the proposition that the employer bore the burden Qf proof merely
because the employer requested a hearing."°
Besides the fact that precedent does not support the court's reasoning,
the practical effect of the decision in Wilson is to substantially undermine the principles established in Maloney and to further encourage
fraudulent activity. Under the holding in Wilson, it is advantageous for
a claimant to secretly return to work while drawing disability benefits.
If the employer fails to discover this deception, the claimant successfully
draws disability benefits even though he is not actually disabled. If his

101.

Id., 484 S.E.2d at 701 (citing Yates v. Hall, 189 Ga. App. 885, 377 S.E.2d 887

(1989), Hartford Accident & Sur. Co. v. Webb, 109 Ga. App. 667, 137 S.E.2d 362 (1964)).
102. See Hart v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 250 Ga. 397, 297 S.E.2d 462 (1982); Cedartown
Nursing Home v. Dunn, 174 Ga. App. 720, 330 S.E.2d 905 (1985); Peterson/Puritan, Inc.
v. Day, 157 Ga. App. 827, 278 S.E.2d 674 (1981). Yates v. Hall, 189 Ga. App. 885, 377

S.E.2d 887 (1989), one of the cases cited by the court as authority for the requirement of
a new award before benefits can be suspended, dealt with the res judicata effect of a prior
award of attorney fees on a subsequent settlement, not with the effect of a prior award on
a suspension of income benefits. Id. at 887, 377 S.E.2d at 889.
103.

1978 Ga. Laws 2220-36.

104. H. Michael Bagley, et al., Workers'Compensation,45 MERCER L. REV. 493,502-10
(1993); JAMES B. HIRS, JR. & ROBERT R. POTTER, GEORGIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
AND PRACTICE § 23-6 (3d ed. 1995).
105. 168 Ga. App. 325, 309 S.E.2d 159 (1983). The case also provides a detailed
discussion of the effect of the 1978 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act that
discarded the necessity of a Board award to suspend benefits in certain circumstances. Id.
at 327-28, 309 S.E.2d at 161-62.
106. 225 Ga. App. at 663, 484 S.E.2d at 700.
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deception is discovered, the court in Wilson places the burden of proof on
the employer to prove a change in condition under different standards
than those in Maloney and requires not only that the employer
demonstrate that the claimant returned to work but also that suitable
work is available." 7 An honest employee, however, who reveals his
return to work and subsequently seeks disability benefits must meet the
Maloney burden of proof to show a diligent but unsuccessful job search.
There would seem to be little reason to reward an individual who
commits fraud by requiring the employer who discovers it to prove a
change in condition twice: once in proving the claimant has returned to
work and again in showing the availability of additional, suitable
employment. The more logical procedure would seem to be the one that
has been followed for many years, which shifts the burden of proof to the
claimant only when there is evidence that the claimant has actually
returned to work. Such evidence demonstrates that the claimant has,
at the very least, undergone an economic change in condition for the
better, thereby requiring proof of a change in condition for the worse
before the employer is liable for additional disability benefits.
With the rash of decisions that have followed Maloney less than two
years after its issuance, it is certain that the controversy in this area of
workers' compensation law will continue. Ultimately, it may be
necessary for the supreme court to revisit Maloney to provide clarification, particularly with regard to the effect of a claimant's fraudulent
receipt of benefits.

IV

CASE LAw DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Any Evidence
As always, the court heard several "any evidence" cases on appeal.
Basically, the "any evidence" rule states that the factual findings of the
Board, in the absence of fraud, are binding upon the courts so long as
there is "sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant"
them."~ The court may, however, review the Board's legal conclusions
to ensure that a decision is not "contrary to law."' In Crider'sFurs,
Inc. v. Atkinson, " the court addressed a "legal issue" in reversing the

107. Id. at 665, 484 S.E.2d at 701 (citing Peterson/Puritan, Inc. v. Day, 157 Ga. App.
827, 278 S.E.2d 674 (1981)).
108. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(c)(4) (1992 & Supp. 1997); see also Iso-Graphics v. Evans, 205
Ga. App. 880, 881, 424 S.E.2d 24, 25 (1992).
109. O.C.GA. § 34-9-105(c)(5) (1992 & Supp. 1997).
110. 221 Ga. App. 681, 472 S.E.2d 507 (1996).
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superior court."' In Atkinson, claimant suffered a back injury while
working for Crider's Furs ("Crider's") in December 1992. After back
surgery, he returned to work but quit shortly thereafter to take another
job with a different employer. He again stopped working, but after a
second surgery, his doctor released him and permitted his return to work
on June 15, 1994. Claimant filed a claim against Crider's, seeking
temporary total disability benefits. The ALJ and the appellate division
awarded benefits through June 15, 1994, finding that claimant had no
restrictions after that date. The superior court reversed the Board,
finding that claimant was totally disabled after June 15, 1994. The
employer-insurer appealed."
The court disagreed with the Board's finding of no disability after
June 15, 1994, citing the medical records of two physicians."' The
first physician found a fifteen percent permanent disability to the whole
body although he imposed no specific limitations upon the employee.
The second physician found a ten percent permanent disability
rating." 4 However, the court also reversed the superior court finding
that claimant was entitled to temporary total disability benefits after
June 15, 1994, noting that the evidence did not demand a finding of total
disability as a matter of law."' The case was remanded to the Board
for factual findings and legal conclusions regarding whether claimant's
indisputable permanent pain would entitle him to benefits under
Essentially, the court determined that
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-263."
the ALJ did not go far enough in her findings because she did not
address the employee's legal7 entitlement to permanency benefits under
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-263.1
Under the "any evidence" rule, the superior court must construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing before the
Board, and the superior court may not substitute itself as the factIn Cox v. Advoni," 9 the issue
finding body in lieu of the Board."
was whether the employer had three employees, thus making him
subject to workers' compensation laws.' The ALJ and the appellate

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
(1995).
119.
120.

Id. at 682, 472 S.E.2d at 508.
Id. at 681-82, 472 S.E.2d at 507-08.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 682-83, 472 S.E.2d at 508.
Id.
Id.
South Ga. Timber Co. v. Petty, 218 Ga. App. 497, 498, 462 S.E.2d 176, 177-78
222 Ga. App. 413, 474 S.E.2d 290 (1996).
Id. at 413-14, 474 S.E.2d at 291; O.C.GA. § 34-9-2(a) (1992 & Supp. 1997).
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division found that the injured employee was the employer's third
employee, thus making the employer responsible for benefits under the
Workers' Compensation Act.'
The superior court reversed the
Board."2
The court of appeals then reversed the superior court,
finding that the superior court erred in implicitly holding that no
evidence supported the Board's affirmance of the AL's finding, thereby
violating the principle that the findings of the State Board of Workers'
Compensation are conclusive and binding if supported by "any evidence."'
Under the "any evidence" standard, the Board's decision must be
affirmed when the ALJ and the appellate division credit a physician's
testimony over that of the employee, or weigh conflicting medical expert
testimony and credit one expert's testimony over another."2 As the
court noted, such determinations are for the ALJ and the appellate
2
division, not for either reviewing court.m
2
In Southwire Co. v. Molden, claimant injured his left hand at
work, and in July 1994, the Board determined that he was entitled to
benefits for a ganglion cyst and tendinitis of the left wrist. In March
1995, claimant's treating doctor concluded that the ganglion cyst and
tendinitis had completely healed, but claimant was then diagnosed with
brachial plexopathy in the left arm. The doctor concluded that the
brachial plexopathy was due to either cancer or severe trauma to the
shoulder and testified that it would be "very unusual" and "extremely
rare" for the repetitive nature of claimant's work to have caused the
condition. The employer then controverted further medical or indemnity
benefits, alleging that the previous work-related injuries had completely
healed and that the present disability was not related to the work. The
AU and the appellate division concluded that claimant's original workrelated injury had completely healed and claimant therefore was no
longer entitled to benefits. The superior court reversed the Board,1 7
essentially substituting itself as the fact-finding body and giving less
credence to the doctor's testimony than to the employee's testimony. The
court of appeals reversed the superior court, noting that as long as the
Board's conclusion is supported by any evidence, the Board's ruling must

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

222 Ga. App. at 413-14, 474 S.E.2d at 291.
Id. at 413, 474 S.E.2d at 291.
Id. at 414, 474 S.E.2d at 291.
Metro Interiors, Inc. v. Cox, 218 Ga. App. 396, 398, 461 S.E.2d 570, 571 (1995).

Id.
223 Ga. App. 389, 477 S.E.2d 646 (1996).
Id. at 389-90, 477 S.E.2d at 646-48.
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be upheld even though other evidence exists that contradicts the
award.128
B. Attorney Fees
The Board may assess attorney fees if any provision of O.C.G.A.
In
section 34-9-221 is violated "without reasonable grounds."'"
Bennett-Murray, Inc. u. Barnes,"s the appellate division properly
assessed attorney fees... because the employer failed to controvert
claimant's right to compensation within twenty-one days after knowledge
of the alleged injury"3 2 and failed to offer any reason for its failure to
file the proper Board forms.'
If the Board assesses attorney fees based upon an employer's defense
of the claim, it must point to evidence in the record that supports the
finding of unreasonableness.' s4 The Board does not satisfy its obligation by simply setting forth its own separate basis for the award.'
In Autry v. Mayor of Savannah,'s claimant was referred to physical
therapy for right arm pain. The employer controverted the referral as
not likely to effect a cure or give relief because claimant was back at her
city job full time and was simultaneously working a part-time job at
night and on weekends. However, the Board awarded claimant medical
benefits and assessed attorney fees for the city's failure to pay for the
physical therapy. The superior court reversed the assessment of
attorney fees, noting that the Board apparently overlooked two grounds,
based upon the medical evidence, for the city's defense.'37 The court
of appeals affirmed the superior court, pointing out that attorney fees
may not be awarded when the matter is closely contested on reasonable
grounds."M Further, the Board should consider all of the evidence in
making the determination and should not ignore or fail to consider any
part of the evidence supporting the employer's defense. 3 9 Even if the

128. Id, 477 S.E.2d at 648.
129. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(bX2) (1992).
130. 222 Ga. App. 137, 473 S.E.2d 166 (1996).
131. Id. at 137, 473 S.E.2d at 166.
132. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(d) (1992).
133. 222 Ga. App. at 137, 473 S.E.2d at 166; O.C.G. § 34-9-221(c).
134. Pet, Inc. v. Ward, 219 Ga. App. 525, 527, 466 S.E.2d 46, 48 (1995).
135. Id. at 526-27, 466 S.E.2d at 48.
136. 222 Ga. App. 691, 475 S.E.2d 702 (1996).
137. Id. at 692, 475 S.E.2d at 702-03.
138. Id., 475 S.E.2d at 703 (citing Brigmond v. Springhill Homes, 180 Ga. App. 875,
876, 350 S.E.2d 846, 847 (1986)).
139. Id. at 693, 475 S.E.2d at 703.
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Board does not accept the employer's defenses, it does not necessarily
render those defenses unreasonable or unfounded."
In St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc. v. Cope,'4" decided shortly after Autry,
the court of appeals reached a different result when confronted with
conflicting medical evidence. Claimant was a nursing assistant who
injured her right upper extremity on July 2, 1992. She was treated for
lateral epicondylitis and was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome in
November 1992. In May 1993, a neurologist found claimant's carpal
tunnel syndrome much improved. However, in July 1993, the treating
physician noted continuing complaints in both arms. In January 1995,
the treating physician wrote a letter noting that the "right carpal tunnel
syndrome was certainly related" to claimant's job injury. At his
deposition in July 1995, the treating physician drastically changed his
opinion, taking the position that the right carpal tunnel syndrome was
not related to the 1992 job injury. Based on this testimony and the May
1993 neurological report, the employer unilaterally suspended benefits,
alleging that claimant had undergone a change in condition for the
better.142
At the hearing the employer had the burden of proving claimant had
The appellate
undergone a change in condition for the better.'
division found that the employer did not carry its burden of proof and
assessed attorney fees because the employer defended the case at least
partially without reasonable grounds.'" The superior court affirmed,
and the court of appeals accepted the case for review. 45 The court of
appeals determined that the employer was essentially trying to "go back"
in time and contest the compensability of the employee's carpal tunnel
syndrome under the guise of arguing a "change in condition.""S Thus,
even though the medical evidence was in conflict in 1995 when the
authorized treating physician changed his opinion as to the cause of the
carpal tunnel syndrome, the court agreed with the Board that it was not
reasonable for the employer to argue a change in condition when it
really was attempting to retroactively controvert the claim. 47

140. Id., 475 S.E.2d at 703-04 (citing Goode Bros. Poultry Co. v. Kin, 201 Ga. App. 557,
560, 411 S.E.2d 724, 727 (1991)).
141. 225 Ga. App. 781, 484 S.E.2d 727 (1997).
142. Id. at 781-82, 484 S.E.2d at 727-29.
143. Id. at 782, 484 S.E.2d at 729 (citing West Point Pepperell, Inc. v. Adams, 152 Ga.
App. 3, 4, 262 S.E.2d 212, 213 (1979)).
144. 225 Ga. App. at 782-83, 484 S.E.2d at 729.
145. Id., 484 S.E.2d at 729-30.
146. Id. at 784, 484 S.E.2d at 731.
147. Id. at 785, 484 S.E.2d at 731.
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C. Arising Out of Employment
In Lee v. *Sears," the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment
granted to an employer and a coworker, holding that the employee's
injury arose out of his employment so that his personal injury action was
barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation
Act.149 Because employee Lee did not have a driver's license, employee
Sears drove him to and from work in a truck owned by their employer,
Hughes Waste Management. One afternoon when work was slow, Lee
and Sears went to a bar. Lee was injured in an accident as Sears was
driving him home from the bar."W Because Lee admitted that the
accident occurred in the course of his employment, the court only had to
An
address whether the accident arose out of the employment.'
injury arises out of employment when a reasonable person would
perceive a causal connection between an employee's working conditions
and his injury. 52 The court found that Lee's injury had a causal
relationship to the employment because the "'work brought him within
the range of danger by requiring his presence in the locale when the
peril struck, even though any other person present would have also been
injured irrespective of his employment.'""' The employee's personal
mission of stopping at the bar did not alter this analysis because the
employee had concluded his personal mission and resumed the employer's business.'5 Thus, the employee's tort action was barred, and his
only remedy against either the employer or the coworker was a claim for
workers' compensation.15
ControvertingEntitlement to Benefits
In CartersvilleReady Mix Co. v. Hamby," the court of appeals held
that an employer cannot controvert a case within sixty days of the first

D.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
152 Ga.
154.

223 Ga. App. 897, 479 S.E.2d 196 (1996).
Id. at 898, 479 S.E.2d at 198; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (1992 & Supp. 1997).
223 Ga. App. at 897, 479 S.E.2d at 197.
1& at 898, 479 S.E.2d at 198.
Hennly v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 355, 356, 444 S.E.2d 317, 319 (1994).
223 Ga. App. at 898,479 S.E.2d at 198 (quoting National Fire Ins. Co. v. Edwards,
App. 566, 567, 263 S.E.2d 455, 456 (1979)).
Id. "Where an employee departs from the employer's business for a personal

reason, but then concludes the personal mission and resumes the employer's business

before an injury occurs, the injury is viewed as arising out of and in the course of
employment." Lewis v. Chatham County Savannah Metro. Planning Comm., 217 Ga. App.
534, 534-35, 458 S.E.2d 173, 174 (1995).
155. 223 Ga. App. at 897-98, 479 S.E.2d at 196-98.
156. 224 Ga. App. 116, 479 S.E.2d 767 (1996).
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payment of benefits if it has not paid all benefits due, including late
penalties,' prior to filing the notice to controvert.'" Although the
employer knew or suspected within a short time after claimant's injury
that the injury was not job-related, the employer did not controvert the
claim within twenty-one days of learning of the injury. Instead, after a
number of weeks, the employer voluntarily commenced payment of
temporary total disability benefits, paying a lump sum for five weeks but
paying no penalty. Subsequently, the employer filed a notice to
controvert within sixty days of the date the first compensation payment
was due"5 and suspended benefits because the injury did not arise out
of and in the course of employment. At the hearing claimant alleged
that his benefits were improperly suspended because the employer had
not paid a $160 penalty for five weeks of overdue benefits prior to
controverting the case."o
The AUI denied the claim, concluding (1) that the failure to pay the
penalty under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(e) did not prevent the employer
from controverting payment because the employer was subject to the
imposition of attorney fees under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-108(b)(2) and (2)
that the weight of credible evidence showed that the injury did not arise
out of and in the course of employment. The appellate division affirmed
the ALJs decision, but the superior court reversed, reasoning that the
employer's failure to pay the penalty prior to filing the notice to
controvert precluded the employer from controverting the claim
regardless of whether the injury arose out of and in the course of
employment.'16
Citing Southeastern Aluminum Recycling, Inc. v. Rayburn,' 2 the
court of appeals agreed with the superior court." In Rayburn the
court held that "the legislative intent behind O.C.G.A. [section] 34-9-221
was to minimize the hardship on the injured worker by requiring the
employer either to act quickly when it knows a claim is controvertible,
so as to expedite final resolution of the matter, or to pay compensation
while investigating the matter more closely."'" The court in Rayburn

157. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(e) (1992) states in pertinent part: "If any income benefits
payable without an award are not paid when due, there shall be added to the accrued
income benefits an amount equal to 15 percent thereof, which shall be paid at the same
time as, but in addition to, the accrued income benefits ...
158. 224 Ga. App. at 117-18, 479 S.E.2d at 768.
159. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-221(h) (1992).
160. 224 Ga. App. at 116-17, 479 S.E.2d at 768.
161. Id, at 117, 479 S.E.2d at 768.
162. 172 Ga. App. 648, 324 S.E.2d 194 (1984).
163. 224 Ga. App. at 117, 479 S.E.2d at 768.
164. 172 Ga. App. at 649, 324 S.E.2d at 194.
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defined "compensation" as "all of the accrued income benefits ...
including penalties provided for any late payment. K65 Although the
dissent in Hamby pointed out that an employer who controverts a case
within sixty days cannot always know prior to the controvert if all
compensation claims have been satisfied,"s this did not convince the
majority. This case is significant because the failure to pay a small
amount in penalties essentially negated all of the employer's defenses at
the hearing. Practitioners should certainly be cognizant of the court's
strict construction of O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(e).
E. Reducing Benefits
In the first case interpreting O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(aX2), 7 a
1992 legislative addition to the change in condition statute, the court
held that an employer may reduce an employee from temporary total
disability to temporary partial disability benefits based upon the
employee's ability to return to work even if the employee has not
actually returned to work.' In MountainsideMedical Center/Pickens
Healthcare v. Tanner, claimant was released to work with restrictions.
During the next fifty-two weeks, she did not find work or did not choose
to return to work. Because claimant earned an average weekly wage of
$200, she received weekly temporary total disability benefits of
$133.34.1 9 The issue was whether claimant could be reduced to a
weekly temporary partial disability payment of less than $133.34 and,
if so, how this amount would be calculated.. 70
Because O.C.G.A. section 34-9-104(a) references O.C.G.A. section 34-9262, the language of that statute is significant to the court decision.''

165. Id.
166. 224 Ga. App. at 121, 479 S.E.2d at 771. The employer may not always know if
there will be a challenge to the average weekly wage computation, or whether a weekly
installment has been timely paid under the mailing provisions of O.C.G.A. section 34-9221(b), or if there will be a dispute whether payment was made in the proper form required
under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-221(a).
167. An employee can be reduced to temporary partial disability benefits when the
following criteria are met: (1) "the injury is not catastrophic," (2) "the employee is not
working," (3) "the employee has been capable of performing work with imitations... for
52 consecutive weeks" or 78 weeks in the aggregate, and (4) "[w]ithin 60 days of the
employee's release to return to work with... limitations," the employer gives notice to the
employee on a form provided by the board of the release to return to work and an
explanation of the limitations or restrictions. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(aX2) (1992).
168. Mountainside Med. Ctr.Pickens Healthcare v. Tanner, 225 Ga. App. 722,723,484
S.E.2d 706, 708 (1997).
169. Id. at 722, 484 S.E.2d at 707.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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O.C.G.A. section 34-9-262 provides that the employee will be paid a
temporary partial disability benefit "equal to two-thirds of the difference
between the average weekly wage before the injury and the average
weekly wage the employee is able to earn thereafter.""' Because the
section does not provide a means for calculating what amount an
employee is "able to earn" when the employee has not actually returned
to work, the Board and the superior court rejected the employer's
assumption that claimant was "able to earn" minimum wage twenty
hours per week.17 The Board found that because the employee had
not actually returned to work, she was able to earn zero dollars; thus,
her temporary partial disability rate would be the same as her temporary total disability rate. 74
The court of appeals reversed the Board's finding, determining that,
based upon the actual language found in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-262, the
legislature intended that an employee's benefits would be reduced to an
The court further stated that it
amount that she is "able" to earn.'
is unreasonable to conclude that an employee is able to earn nothing
simply because she is earning nothing, and "it is absurd to award a
claimant an increased award of benefits because she refuses to work or
for some other reason is not working."'76 The court concluded that in
the absence of any legislative guidance, the employer may reasonably
theorize, based upon proof of available jobs for which the employee is
qualified, what dollar amount the employee is "able to earn."' 7 '
In direct response to Tanner, the Board passed Rule 262178 to guide
employers in calculating the temporary partial benefit rate. Board Rule
262(a)(1) provides that if the employee is receiving the maximum
temporary total rate, he will be reduced to the maximum temporary
partial rate. Board Rule 262(a)(2) provides that if the employee is
receiving less than the maximum temporary total rate, he will receive
the same amount of benefits, not to exceed the maximum temporary
partial rate. In short, the Board rule disagrees with Tanner in that the
employer is not allowed to "reasonably theorize" what the employee is

172. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-262.
173. 225 Ga. App. at 722, 484 S.E.2d at 707. See also H. Michael Bagley, et al.,
Workers' Compensation, 44 MERCER L. REV. 460-62 (1992) (discussing how to calculate
temporary partial disability benefits under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(a)).
174. 225 Ga. App. at 722, 484 S.E.2d at 707.
175. 1I at 723-24, 484 S.E.2d at 708.
176. Id. at 723, 484 S.E.2d at 708.
177. Id.
178. See GA. BD. OF WoRERS' COMPENSATION R. 262 (1997).
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The Board rule allows the employer to reduce the
able to earn.'
employee to the maximum temporary partial rate as long as his
temporary total disability benefits exceed that rate. If the employee's
temporary total disability benefits are less than the maximum temporary
partial rate, he will see no change in his benefits after fifty-two weeks.
Employment Relationship
The court addressed the employment relationship in several cases that
turned on very specific facts. In Peters v. Kevin Moody Construction,"s
the court held that a sole proprietor who exempts himself""' from the
workers' compensation coverage of his own business is not precluded
from being a covered employee of another employer. 82 The court held
that the sole proprietor is estopped from making a claim against his own
business, but he may certainly make a claim if he is an employee of
another business."s
F

In Upshaw v. Hale Intermodal Transport Co.,184 the owner-operator

of an eighteen-wheel tractor trailer was injured in a serious motor
vehicle accident. The injured worker applied for workers' compensation
benefits, which the trucking company denied, alleging that the driver
was an independent contractor. The Board and the superior court
denied benefits, agreeing with the employer that the driver was an
independent contractor.'85 The court of appeals accepted the case to
determine if recent changes in federal and state law affected the status
of owner-operators of leased vehicles as to workers' compensation
O.C.G.A. section 34-9-1(2) states that an owner-operabenefits.l"
tor 87 is deemed to be an independent contractor."s Because the
driver alleged that federal law preempted the state workers' compensation statute, the court reviewed the applicable federal regulations.!"9
Federal regulations require that owner-operators sign written leases,

179. The Board has the power to make rules that are not consistent with the Act.

Board rules may not enlarge, reduce, or otherwise affect the substantive rights of the
parties. Holt Serv. Co. v. Modlin, 163 Ga. App. 283, 285, 293 S.E.2d 741, 742 (1982).
180. 223 Ga. App. 133, 476 S.E.2d 772 (1996).
181. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2.2 (1992).

182. 223 Ga. App. at 133, 476 S.E.2d at 773.
183. Id. at 134, 476 S.E.2d at 773.
184. 224 Ga. App. 239, 480 S.E.2d 277 (1997).
185. Id. at 239, 480 S.E.2d at 278.

186. Id.
187. An "owner-operator" is defined as "an equipment lessor who leases his vehicular
equipment with driver to a carrier." O.C.G.A. § 40-2-87(19) (1997).
188. O.C.GA. § 34-9-1(2) (Supp. 1997).
189. 224 Ga. App. at 239-41, 480 S.E.2d at 278-79.
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have exclusive possession, control, and use of the equipment and that
the carrier assumes complete responsibility for operation of the
equipment for the duration of the lease.1" In 1992 the federal regulations were also amended to specifically provide that "nothing in the
provisions [is] ... intended to affect whether the lessor or driver
provided by the lessor is an independent contractor or an employee of
the authorized carrier lessee.""" The driver in Upshaw was driving
under a written lease that in all respects complied with the federal
requirements, and he had also signed an "Independent Contractor
Release From Workers' Compensation Claims."" The court held that
the federal law was unambiguous and was not intended to preempt the
clear Georgia law embodied in O.C.G.A. section 34-9-1(2), and thus the
driver was found to be an independent contractor.'
The court reached a different result in an independent contractor case
involving a cab driver. In Yellow Cab of Chatham County v. Karowski, " ' a cab driver was injured while driving for Yellow Cab of Chatham County, Inc."9 5 The sole issue was whether the driver was an
independent contractor or an employee." The court of appeals relied
upon both a previous decision' and the city code of Savannah to
affirm the Board's decision that the taxi driver was an employee rather
The court analyzed the Savannah
than an independent contractor.'
city code requirements that separate licenses be obtained both for
ownership of a taxicab business and to drive a taxicab.'9 The court
determined that if the injured taxi driver had in fact obtained both of
these separate licenses, he may have operated lawfully as an indepenThe driver, however, did not have a taxicab
dent contractor."°
business license. Further, he operated a cab from Yellow Cab's taxi
stand, his cab was painted Yellow Cab's assigned shade of yellow, it had.
Yellow Cab's name on its sides and top, and the number on display in
his cab was assigned by the city to Yellow Cab."° Based on these
facts, the driver was found to be an employee of Yellow Cab.2'
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

49 C.F.R. § 1057.12(a), (cXl) (1996).
49 C.F.R. § 1057.12(c)(4) (1996).
224 Ga. App. at 240, 480 S.E.2d at 279.
Id.
226 Ga. App. 63, 486 S.E.2d 39 (1997).
Id. at 63, 486 S.E.2d at 40.
Id.
Worell v. Yellow Cab Co., 146 Ga. App. 748, 247 S.E.2d 569 (1978).
226 Ga. App. at 64-65, 486 S.E.2d at 40-41.
Id. at 64, 486 S.E.2d at 41.
Id.
Id. at 64-65, 486 S.E.2d at 41.
Id. at 65, 486 S.E.2d at 41.
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In Housing Authority of Cartersuille v. Jackson,' the court of
appeals determined that an employer-employee relationship existed
when the injured worker was serving in a full-time position without
compensation. ' Hugh Jackson was appointed to the board of commissioners of the Housing Authority of the City of Cartersville ("the
Authority"). Twice during his tenure on the board, the executive director
resigned, and Jackson agreed to serve as acting executive director until
a permanent replacement could be hired. He agreed to serve without
compensation, other than lunch at board meetings and payment of his
expenses when he attended meetings on the Authority's behalf. Jackson
maintained office hours, was responsible for the Authority's daily
operations, signed payroll and other checks, supervised, hired and
terminated Authority employees, and dealt with the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development. He was subject to discharge by the
.
Authority's board of commissioners.'
During his second term as acting director, while driving an Authorityowned car on Authority business, Jackson was injured in a motor vehicle
accident. When he sought medical benefits under the Workers'
Compensation Act, the Board determined that he was an "employee"
entitled to receive those benefits. On appeal, the city argued that
compensation, or lack of it, was crucial to the determination of whether
Jackson was an employee." The court agreed that compensation was
certainly one factor but went on to cite the Act's definition of an
employee as "every person in the service of another under any contract
of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied."2 7 The main test of the
employment ("master-servant") relationship is whether the master is
granted or assumes the right to control the time, manner, means, and
method of executing the work and whether the master has the right to
Because the Authority had the right to
discharge the servant.'
discharge Jackson and to control his work, the court found that Jackson
was an employee who was entitled to receive workers' compensation
medical benefits.2"

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

226 Ga. App. 182, 486 S.E.2d 54 (1997).
Id. at 184-85, 486 S.E.2d at 57.
Id. at 182-85, 486 S.E.2d at 55-57.
Id. at 183, 486 S.E.2d at 56.
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(2)).
Golosh v. Cherokee Cab Co., 226 Ga. 636, 638, 176 S.E.2d 925, 927 (1970).
226 Ga. App. at 184, 486 S.E.2d at 56.
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Exclusive Remedy
In Zaytzeff v. Safety-Kleen Corp.,210 the court of appeals affirmed a
grant of summary judgment to the employer in a tort claim filed by the
employee and his wife, holding that although the employee failed to
show at his workers' compensation hearing that he suffered an injury by
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, the
exclusive remedy provisions of the Act barred the tort claim.2U
Claimant alleged that he was injured while cleaning up a toxic chemical
spill without being issued either a respirator or protective clothing other
than gloves. The AIJ, however, found that he failed to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that he suffered an injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment.21 2
The court of appeals noted that while "a claim comes within the
coverage of the [Workers' Compensation] Act, it does not follow that it
is always compensable." 2" That an injury is not compensable under
the Act does not necessarily mean it is not within the purview of the Act
for purposes of the exclusivity provisions. 214 Thus, merely because the
ALJ concluded that Zaytzeff failed to carry his burden of proof does not
215
provide any exception to the Act's exclusive remedy provisions.
Zaytzeff went so far as to allege that his coworkers may have been
negligent or even intentionally exposed him to the toxic chemical,216
but the court of appeals noted that a case against a coworker would be
barred unless the tortious act was committed for personal reasons
unrelated to the conduct of the employer's business. 217
G.

Farm Laborer
Whether a farm laborer is an employee entitled to workers' compensa-'"
tion is not often litigated, primarily because O.C.G.A. section 34-9-2(a)
exempts farm laborers and their employers from the Workers' Compen-

H.

210. 222 Ga. App. 48, 473 S.E.2d 565 (1996).
211. Id. at 50, 473 S.E.2d at 567.

212. Id. at 48, 473 S.E.2d at 566.
213. Id. at 50, 473 S.E.2d at 567 (citing Synalloy Corp. v. Newton, 254 Ga. 174, 175,
326 S.E.2d 470, 471 (1985)).
214. Johnson v. Hames Contracting, Inc., 208 Ga. App. 664, 668, 431 S.E.2d 455, 459
(1993).
215. 222 Ga. App. at 50, 473 S.E.2d at 567.
216. Id., 473 S.E.2d at 568.

217. Id. (citing Wall v. Phillips, 210 Ga. App. 490, 436 S.E.2d 517 (1993) as persuasive
and controlling, noting that "'the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act is now the exclusive
remedy for injuries sustained by an employee during the course of employment resulting

from the negligence of a co-worker.'").
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21 however, the injured
sation Act. In Riley v. Taylor Orchards,
worker
alleged that Taylor Orchards actually elected to provide coverage for
him 219 although the insurer contended that it terminated coverage
before the injury.'
The AUJ and the appellate division found that the burden was on the
worker to establish every fact necessary to uphold an award of compensation. Thus, the worker was required to provide proof that the
employer filed Board form WC-30 electing to be covered by the Act, but
there was no evidence that the employer filed the notice."l Because
it was undisputed, however, that the employer had purchased coverage
at one time, the insurer would have been liable under the policy if the
policy remained in effect.2' In this case Liberty had offered to renew
the policy, but the insured did not send in the premium.'
Under
O.C.G.A. section 33-24-47, Liberty was not required to send a cancellation notice. 22 Claimant could not carry his burden of proof, and thus,
the court of appeals affirmed the Board.2

I. Group Health Benefits
Although it is unlikely to affect many claims, Carrollv. Diamond Rug
& Carpet Mills, Inc.22 is nonetheless worthy of discussion because it
addresses a problem with a former Georgia Code section. Carroll
suffered a back injury in 1988. While her claim for benefits was pendinge
before the Board, she underwent surgery that was paid for by her group
health insurance carrier. Several years later, and after an award in her
favor, Carroll sought reimbursement from the workers' compensation
carrier for the amounts her group health carrier had paid.'
After
considering the law in effect at the time, specifically O.C.G.A. section 349-206, the court of appeals ruled for Carroll.'
At the time of her
218. 226 Ga. App. 394, 486 S.E.2d 617 (1997).
219. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-2.3 (1992) states:
An employer of farm laborers who has filed a notice pursuant to this Code section
shall not discontinue the provision of workers' compensation coverage for
individuals employed as farm laborers until the notice filed with the board is
revoked in a manner to be specified by rule of the board and written notice is
given to each affected employee in a manner to be specified by rule of the board.
220. 226 Ga. App. at 395, 486 S.E.2d at 618.
221. Id. at 394-95, 486 S.E.2d at 618-19.
222. Id. at 395, 486 S.E.2d at 619.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 396, 486 S.E.2d at 619.
225. Id. at 395, 486 S.E.2d at 619.
226. 224 Ga. App. 361, 480 S.E.2d 374 (1997).
227. Id. at 361, 480 S.E.2d at 374.
228. Id. at 363, 480 S.E.2d at 376.
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injury, an employer was required to reimburse a claimant for payments
made by third parties, including group insurers, unless the third-party
provider directly filed a claim for reimbursement. As noted by the court,
in this scenario "[either the employee gains by being paid directly...
or the workers' compensation insurance carrier gains by avoiding a
disbursement for which it is liable."m Although the Code section was
amended in 1990 to prevent a windfall by requiring reimbursement only
for medical expenses paid directly by the claimant, the court concluded
that this was a substantive right and, therefore, Carroll was entitled to
the monies
because her group carrier never filed a claim for reimburse23 o
ment.
J. Intervening-SuperveningAccident
Whether a subsequent accident or aggravation terminates an
employer's liability for workers' compensation benefits is a question
frequently raised before the Board. Unfortunately, there seem to be few
cases on point when the accident or aggravation is the result of
something other than a subsequent work-related incident.231 Simply
stated, this is a causation issue, one which usually, if not always,
involves a factual determination by the Board.
In Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Hallisey,'2 the court of appeals reversed an award of benefits to claimant on the grounds that he
aggravated a work-related back injury while playing golf." Applying
a negligence theory, the court held that when Hallisey aggravated his
condition playing golf, he "broke the chain of causation between [his]
initial injury and his resulting disability" as a matter of law.'
The
decision was appealed, and the supreme court acknowledged that while
other jurisdictions may follow this approach, Georgia does not."5 In
reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court held that "[i]f the
legislature intended to bar an employee from receiving benefits because
he aggravated an original work injury by engaging in negligent conduct
outside of the workplace, it could have done so. 2M

229. Id.
230. Id., 480 S.E.2d at 375-76.
231. See, e.g., Shuman v. Engineered Fabrics, 220 Ga. App. 636,469 S.E.2d 847 (1996);
Garrard v. Pitts Plumbing Co., 163 Ga. App. 457, 294 S.E.2d 658 (1982); Peachtree Plaza
Hotel v. Haynes, 163 Ga. App. 831, 296 S.E.2d 147 (1982); Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v.
Magee, 162 Ga. App. 865, 292 S.E.2d 477 (1982).
232. 221 Ga. App. 325, 471 S.E.2d 231 (1996).
233. Id at 325-27, 471 S.E.2d at 232-33.
234. Id. at 327, 471 S.E.2d at 233.
235. Hallisey v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 268 Ga. 57, 59, 484 S.E.2d 653, 654 (1997).
236. Id at 59-60, 484 S.E.2d at 654-55.
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The argument that Hallisey's aggravation was due to his own
negligence appears to have been an innovative attempt to avoid the
"weakened condition" theory. Under Georgia law, if a claimant's work
injury is further aggravated because he is in a weakened state, the
aggravation is compensable.' 7 While it sounds simple, Hallisey is a
good example of just how difficult it is to apply the theory. In light of
this decision, it seems the claimant's conduct is irrelevant unless it rises
to the level of willfull or intentional. To successfully argue that the
claimant is no longer entitled to benefits, the employer must prove at the
Board level that there was a definite aggravation, that it was not due to
a weakened condition, that it was not temporary in nature, and that the
aggravation amounted to a new injury. Fort Howard Paper Company
failed to make this showing, which is the reason the Board's award in
favor of claimant was eventually upheld.'
Medical Benefits
There were two cases during the survey period addressing the
claimant's entitlement to medical benefits. In Pringle v. Mayor of
Sauannah, claimant suffered a catastrophic injury. After his
accident, Pringle was forced to move into a handicapped-accessible
apartment. Because the monthly rent was higher than that of the
apartment where he had been living at the time of his accident, Pringle
sought reimbursement for the difference. His employer rejected his
request, arguing that specialized housing costs did not qualify as
The court of appeals
medical, income, or rehabilitation benefits.'
sided with Pringle, holding that the Workers' Compensation Act
"requires reasonable and necessary rehabilitation services and such
services are defined by the Workers' Compensation Board Rules as
requiring home modifications, in-home care, or other services necessary
to return Pringle to the least restrictive lifestyle possible."24' The
Board has the authority to determine whether an expense or service is
reasonable or necessary. 2
In Williams v. West Central Georgia Bank,'m claimant suffered a
compensable back injury. After two failed surgeries, she sought approval

K.

237.
Ins. Co.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Atkinson v. Home Indem. Co., 141 Ga. App. 687,234 S.E.2d 359 (1977); Travelers
v. L.P. Caldwell, 135 Ga. App. 640, 218 S.E.2d 653 (1975).
221 Ga. App. at 327, 471 S.E.2d at 233.
223 Ga. App. 751, 478 S.E.2d 139 (1996).
Id. at 751-52, 478 S.E.2d at 139-40.
Id. at 754-55, 478 S.E.2d at 141-42.
I& at 755, 478 S.E.2d at 142.
225 Ga. App. 237, 483 S.E.2d 607 (1997).

414

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

for a surgical procedure that had not yet been approved by the Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA"). The Board awarded Williams the surgery,
but the superior court reversed, finding that the Board had exceeded its
authority under O.C.G.A. section 34-9-200(a).'" The court of appeals
reversed the superior court, holding that the Board's discretionary power
Because there was evidence
was not limited by FDA guidelines.'
supporting the finding that the "procedure was reasonably required and
likely to effect a cure, give relief, or restore Williams to suitable
employment," the Board's decision was affirmed.'
L. Misrepresentationsby Employee
The misrepresentation of a physical condition has, in certain instances,
been grounds for denying workers' compensation benefits in Georgia
since 1989."'7 In Georgia Electric Co. v. Rycroft, the reason for denying
workers' compensation benefits was the misrepresentation of a physical
condition.'
In Dynasty Sample Co. v. Beltran,249 the employer
sought to extend the misrepresentation theory to deny benefits to illegal
aliens who suffered work injuries but who were found to have obtained
their employment by making false statements or submitting false docuThe court of appeals refused to allow the employer to deny
ments.'
all benefits, holding there was no causal connection between the false
representation and the injury for which the employee was seeking
benefits; this analysis is commonly referred to as the third prong of the
Rycroft test.25 ' However, the court did not take issue with the Board's
finding that the employee was barred from collecting disability benefits
after being released to light duty because the employee's status as an
illegal alien was the dominant reason for the inability to find employment.2"2
In Caldwell v. Aarlin/Holcombe Armature Co.,258 claimant attempted to use the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") to prevent the
employer from raising a misrepresentation defense. Caldwell knowingly
misrepresented his physical condition during the application process.
Shortly after becoming employed with Holcombe, he filed a workers'

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. at 237-38, 483 S.E.2d at 607-08.
Id. at 238, 483 S.E.2d at 608-09.
Id. at 239, 483 S.E.2d at 609.
Georgia Elec. Co. v. Rycroft, 259 Ga. 155, 378 S.E.2d 111 (1989).
Id at 155-56, 378 S.E.2d at 112.
224 Ga. App. 90, 479 S.E.2d 773 (1996).
1d at 90, 479 S.E.2d at 774.
Id. at 92, 479 S.E.2d at 775.
Id.
267 Ga. 613, 481 S.E.2d 196 (1997).
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compensation claim maintaining that his job duties had aggravated a
pre-existing condition, which he admittedly failed to disclose. At the
hearing, he argued that the employer had violated the ADA and,
therefore, was barred from using the misrepresentations on the job
application against him. The Board rejected Caldwell's argument, and
he appealed, contending that Rycroft should be overruled or at least
modified because it was inconsistent with the ADA.'
The supreme
court was unimpressed and rejected Caldwell's request on essentially
two grounds.'
First, not all employers are subject to the ADA.'
There was no reason to take the defense away from employers with less
than fifteen employees.2 5 More importantly, "[mlisrepresenting the
truth on an improper job application is not one of the avenues provided
by the ADA and the ADA does not authorize or countenance the use of
knowing and willful misrepresentations by employees in response to
improper questioning by an employer."2 If Caldwell's ADA rights had
been violated, he should have filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission instead of misrepresenting his physical
condition during the application process.'
M. Procedure
Appealing to the superior court level has been hazardous since the
General Assembly introduced time limitations in 1988.26 As of July
1, 1997, these time limits were somewhat relaxed.28' Unfortunately
for the employer in MacKenzie v. Say-A-Lot Food Store,m the changes
did not come soon enough. The superior court attempted to reverse an
assessment of attorney fees in favor of claimant but issued the order
outside the time period prescribed in the statute.2
Thus, while the
superior court attempted to give the employer some "relief," it failed.
Under the recent amendment, the time period for a hearing remains
sixty days but runs from the date of docketing with the superior court
as opposed to the date when the appellant files the appeal with the

254. Id. at 614-15, 481 S.E.2d at 197-98.

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 615-16, 481 S.E.2d at 198.
Id. at 615, 481 S.E.2d at 198.
Id.
Id. at 615-16, 481 S.E.2d at 198.
Id. at 616, 481 S.E.2d at 198.
1988 Ga. Laws 535-38 (codified at O.C.G-.A § 34-9-105(b) (1992)).
1997 Ga. Laws 1367,1369-70, § 4 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) (Supp. 1997)).
226 Ga. App. 32, 485 S.E.2d 559 (1997).
Id. at 32-33, 485 S.E.2d at 560.

416

MERCER LAW REVIEW ,

[Vol. 49

Board. 26 The court's decision, however, must still be entered within
a twenty-day period.2"
N. Standardof Review
As most practitioners are aware, the standard of review when on
appeal to the appellate division was amended effective July 1, 1994 to
one of "a preponderance of competent and credible evidence contained
within the records."
Although this "new standard still authorizes
the appellate division to weigh the evidence, make determinations
regarding the credibility of the evidence, and engage in a broader
standard of review than that permitted under the 'any evidence'
standard," it must accept the findings of the ALJ that are supported by
a preponderance of competent and credible evidence. 21 In BennettMurray, Inc. v. Barnes,' the court defined these terms. "Preponderance of the evidence" means the superior weight of the evidence, while
"competent evidence" means evidence that is "admissible."2
0.

Statutory Employer
In Pogue v. Oglethorpe Power Corp.,27° the supreme court addressed
a certified question from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
concerning exclusive remedy protection for Oglethorpe Power.27 ' The
question was whether a "'premise owner' [was] entitled to the statutory
tort immunity provided by O.C.G.A. [section] 34-9-11 if the premise
owner has purchased a 'wrap-up' insurance policy to provide workers'
compensation insurance coverage for all on-site contractors and
subcontractors." 2
The court answered the question in the negative."7 Pogue had sued Oglethorpe for negligent failure to provide a
safe work place as well as negligent inspection. The contract did not
27 4
meet the requirements of a workers' compensation insurance policy.
While the contract "benefitted the employer by providing for the

264. 1997 Ga. Laws 1367,1369-70, § 4 (codified at O.C.GA. § 34-9-105(b) (Supp. 1997)).
265. Udt
266. 1994 Ga. Laws 887, 894, § 8 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 34-9-103(a) (Supp. 1997)).
267. AT&T v. Cotten, 222 Ga. App. 261, 263, 474 S.E.2d 102, 104 (1996). See also
Bankhead Enters. v. Beavers, 267 Ga. App. 506, 480 S.E.2d 840 (1997).
268. 222 Ga. App. 137, 473 S.E.2d 166 (1996).
269. Id. at 139, 473 S.E.2d at 168.
270. 267 Ga. 332, 477 S.E.2d 107 (1996).
271. Id. at 332, 477 S.E.2d at 107-08.
272. Id.
273. Id., 477 S.E.2d at 108.
274. I at 332-33, 477 S.E.2d at 108.
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payment of premiums, the bottom line is that the contract did not
benefit Pogue as a workers' compensation insurance contract would.' 27
A somewhat different result was reached in England v. Beers
Construction Co."' In 1974, Beers was contracted by Southern
Regional Hospital to install a metal grate over an airshaft. In 1992,
Beers was again contracted by Southern Regional to perform work on its
emergency room. Beers subcontracted part of this work to Bremen Steel,
which in turn subcontracted to England's employer, Park Place Steel,
Inc. England was injured while standing on the very grate Beers
installed in 1974. He filed a tort suit against both Beers and Southern
Regional. The trial court dismissed Beers on a motion for summary
judgment but refused to dismiss Southern Regional.27 7 An appeal was
taken.
The fact that Beers was not in "contractual privity" with England's
direct employer did not deny it the tort immunity afforded by the
Act.27 Had either the direct employer or Bremen failed to carry
workers' compensation coverage, Beers would have been liable for
benefits. Likewise, the fact that Beers may have made contracts with
Bremen as well as Southern Regional regarding workers' compensation
rights or obligations was irrelevant. Under Georgia law, statutory
employment obligations may not be contracted awayY Finally, the
court rejected England's argument that tort immunity did not extend to
Beers' alleged negligence in the 1974 grate installation. 2w The focus
is "not on the defendant's conduct in causing the injury, but on the
plaintiff's circumstances in sustaining it." ' Because England was
performing work for Bremen at the time of his accident, his injury arose
out of and in the course of employment, which meant that it fell within
"the scope of the Workers' Compensation Act for purposes of benefits
eligibility as well as tort immunity."28 2 The denial of the motion for
summary judgment by Southern Regional, the owner of the property,
was affirmed.2
In Sherwin-Williams Co. u. Escuadra, 4 the court of appeals was
asked to address whether a sole proprietor-owner-subcontractor could be

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. at 334, 477 S.E.2d at 109.
224 Ga. App. 44, 479 S.E.2d 420 (1996).
Id. at 45, 479 S.E.2d at 422.
Id. at 45-46, 479 S.E.2d at 422-23.
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awarded benefits as a statutory employee.'
Escuadra, the sole
proprietor of a carpet installation business, worked as an independent
contractor for Sherwin-Williams. Although he had attempted to obtain
workers' compensation insurance for his own business, he discovered
after his injury that he had no coverage because his insurance agent had
absconded with the premium money. Escuadra then filed a claim
against Sherwin-Williams, arguing that he was entitled to coverage as
a statutory employee."
While there was no doubt that Escuadra's
own employees could recover as statutory employees, the same could not
be said for him. 7 In a somewhat perplexing opinion, the court of
appeals ruled that if a sole proprietor elected to be included as an
employee under his own coverage, as allowed under O.C.G.A. section 349-2.2, then he would be entitled to make a claim as a statutory
employee.'
Because there was no evidence that Escuadra had done
so, he could not recover. The court simply stopped at that point,'
arguably missing the fact that if a sole proprietor-owner obtains
coverage and gives proper notice to his carrier of his intention to be
treated as an employee for purposes of workers' compensation, then
there is no reason to reach the question of whether he is a statutory
employee because he will already be covered.
P. Statute of Limitations
The issue before the court of appeals in Queen Carpet, Inc. v.
Moynihan2' was simply whether the employee had timely filed his
claim. 1 Moynihan contended that his claim had been filed within one
year of employer-provided treatment and, therefore, was not barred by
the statute of limitations. Although he may have been treated by a
physician to whom he had been referred by his employer's workers'
compensation department, the bills had been paid by Queen Carpet's
self-insurance hospitalization policy and his personal insurance. 292
Payments made under a group medical insurance policy will not toll the
statute of limitations. 8 Furthermore, the time is measured from the
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date of treatment, not the date of payment.'
was, in fact, time-barred." 5
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Thus, Moynihan's claim

Q.

Subrogation
Although subrogation returned to the Workers' Compensation Act in
1992, there have been few cases rendered to date construing this vague
statute. However, as the employer discovered in GeorgiaStarPlumbing,
Inc. v. Bowen,' portions of the Code section are clear. Jeffrey Stilley
was injured in an automobile accident and filed a tort claim against the
driver, Krista Bowen, and her mother within one year. He also filed a
workers' compensation claim, which his employer, Georgia Star
Plumbing, contested. While his workers' compensation claim was being
litigated, he settled the tort claim, releasing both defendants from
further liability. Workers' compensation benefits were commenced after
the settlement, and at that time, Stilley's employer and its workers'
compensation carrier filed suit against the Bowens pursuant to O.C.G.A.
section 34-9-11.1 seeking recovery of the benefits paid. They did not
succeed. Even though notice of a "potential" subrogation claim had been
given, no workers' compensation benefits were paid prior to the
settlement between Stilley and the Bowens. Thus, there was no
enforceable lien against the Bowens. 7
Subsequent Injury Trust Fund
The perils associated with filing a claim against the Subsequent Injury
Trust Fund ("SITF") became apparent in the case of GeorgiaSubsequent
Consolidated
Injury Trust Fund v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc.'
Freightways accepted claimant's back injury that occurred on June 11,
1990. In November of that year, claimant also sought treatment for his
neck. Shortly thereafter, he requested a hearing to determine compensability of a neck injury arising out of the June accident. In December
1991 the ALJ ruled that Consolidated was responsible for payment of
medical expenses for treatment of claimant's neck on the grounds that
the expenses arose out of the June 11, 1990 accident. On April 29, 1992,
while the award was on appeal, Consolidated filed a claim with the
SITF. Two weeks later, the appellate division affirmed the AU's
decision.'
R.
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The SITF disputed Consolidated's claim, arguing it was not timely.
The trial court sided with Consolidated, holding that O.C.G.A. section
34-9-360(e)' applied to require evidence of payment of weekly income
benefits or an award from the Board as a prerequisite to reimbursement
from the SITF; the court of appeals disagreed and reversed. 1 "Making a timely claim to the Fund and obtaining reimbursement from the
Whether a claim has been
Fund are distinguishable functions."'
timely filed is governed by O.C.G.A. section 34-9-362. 8°3 Because
Consolidated had paid seventy-eight weeks of indemnity benefits before
filing its claim, the SITF was under no obligation to reimburse it.'
V.

CONCLUSION

As noted above, a number of the cases decided during the survey
period are before the Georgia Supreme Court upon petition for certiorari.
Practitioners should be watchful, therefore, for supreme court decisions
that may resolve some of the controversy created by a few of the court
of appeals decisions. As ever, workers' compensation law remains fluid,
and the pendulum now seems to have swung back to the courts from the
legislature as the primary source of change.
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